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ABSTRACT --
This paper examines the causes of the run up in house prices between 1998 and
2006 and the subsequent fall. It is argued that two unique factors have been at work: a
true "bubble" in 2"'' homes, and a fundamental expansion and now contraction of
mortgage credit availability. These "'new" factors render traditional econometric
forecasting relatively useless in judging where markets will go in the future. Instead the
paper relies on theory - suggesting that a recovery in sales and an accompanying
reduction in the for-sale inventory are both necessary and sufficient to restore price
stability and then growth. The paper shows that the relationships between sales, prices
and the inventory are complicated and reviews recent econometric evidence about them.
A recovery in prices will require (1) renewed purchases of housing by T' time buyers as
well as investors. (2) several years more of record low construction, and (3) some form of
amelioration or resolution of foreclosures.

I. Introduction.
In the last decade, the movement of US house prices has departed dramatically
from historical patterns. From 1998 to 2006 prices in many US cities rose between 50%
and 100% when adjusted for inflation. Many authors feared a housing "bubble" was in
the making [Shiller (2005)] while others argued that loose monetary policy and lower
interest rates following the 2001 stock market crash explained the pattern [Himmelberg,
Mayer and Sinai (2005)] . Recently, much of this discussion has reversed. In 2007-2008
prices suddenly stopped rising and began falling quite noticeably in virtually all cities. To
date (2008q2) the declines have ranged from 5% to 30%. This price decline has for the
first time triggered a financial crisis, which in turn is generating a sharp general economic
recession. The discussion has now turned to when and how housing prices will stabilize,
much less even recover. Given the contamination to the more general economy and
financial markets, the question has considerable urgency.
This paper does a number of things to review what we know about the rise in
house prices, their subsequent collapse and to investigate when they might stabilize and
recover. In particular, the following are addressed.
1). Historically, how has housing moved with the macro-economy and are these
relationship merely repeating themselves this time, or has something unique happened?
2). If the run up in prices from 1998-2006. and the subsequent decline was unique
and cannot be explained with econometric models, what did cause the movements, and
how can future prospects be assessed?
3). Without econometric tools, an estimate of future price movements must be
based more on theor)'. What do we know theoretically about the movement in prices,
sales and the vacant inventory of units? Can we use such information to predict the
hoped-for recovery?
4). With this approach, what exactly will it take for prices to stabilize and then
recover and how likely are these?
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the data
on the co-movements of housing and the economy. Then, Section 111 undertakes an
exercise in out-of-sample forecasting to show that the movement in prices over the last
decade is completely unexplained by local and national economic fundamentals. This
would seem to render econometric forecasting of little use in assessing the future, so
Section IV provides some insight into the "unique" factors working on housing over the
last decade. Sections V and VI review how prices are linked closely, but in complicated
ways, to housing sales and the for-sale inventory (vacancy). This provides at least a
theoretical framework for ftiture predictions. Section VII shows all of (the many) factors
that will have to come into play in order for prices to recover, and assesses the likelihood
of this occurring.
II. Housing and the Macro Economy.
Any thought that history has been repeating itself recently can be rapidly
dismissed with the aid of two graphs. Figures 1 and 2 plot (respectively) new housing
construction and price changes against the single best measure of US economic
performance -job creation. The plot for construction goes back somewhat further, since
reliable price indices (here the CSW 10 City Index is used) have existed only since the
early 1970s. ' .. : : ' ^ • ,
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Figure 1: Housing Construction, Job Growth
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In both figures, movements in housing and the US economy are very closely
linked until the around 2000. After that, prices and construction soar for 6 years despite a
sharp recession in 2001-2002. After 2007, it is also clear that the down turn in housing
leads the economic decline, while in previous recessions housing either followed or was
contemporaneous with the broader economy.
III. Can economic fundamentals explain housing prices over the last decade?
While Figures 1 and 2 are suggestive that something new was happening over the
last decade they hardly constitute proof. The question of why prices rose and then
corrected between 1998 and 2008 needs more than some descriptive analysis of house
prices relative to job growth, income, or interest rates. The approach we use here is to
estimate an econometric forecasting model using data only through some date (here
1998:4 is chosen). Then, prices are forecast out-of-sample forward with this model using
the actual 1999-2008 changes in that economic data. The question is whether the model
picks up the rapid rise in prices from 1998-2006 and the decline since? '
There is a long literature on house price forecasting models. As recently
summarized by Capozza, Hendershott and Mack [CHM, 2004] there is wide consensus
that as markets grow in employment, income and population, prices should also increase.
There is likewise consensus that they should move inversely to some measure of the cost
of capital. Like many authors in the past, CHM apply an Error Correction Model [ECM]
approach that uses these variables. The 2-stage ECM approach however has been recently
questioned by Gallin [2006], who argues such models should just directly predict prices
with the combination of economic variables and lagged prices.
Another more serious criticism of univariate models is that they ignore the supply
side of the market. This of course can be handled explicitly by jointly modeling prices
and the housing stock with a 2-variabIe VAR. Early work by Dipasquale and Wheaton
[1994] used a structured VAR, while more recent papers by Evenson [2004] and Harter-
Dreiman [2004] use unstructured VAR models. Such models also are able to estimate an
implied supply elasticity for each market. Glaeser et al.[2005] argues that a declining
supply elasticity may have caused prices to rise "excessively" of late - due largely to
increased local development regulations. Identifying such changes in supply elasticities
is possible however, only if a unique instrument (e.g. "regulation") can be found for the
estimated VAR supply equations. '^ .
It is important to point out several observations about the supply side of the
current housing market. First as shown in Figure I, the national number of constructed
housing units 2006 tied an all time record before collapsing in 2008. The "robustness" of
recent supply will become even more apparent when later compared to household
'The models could be estimated with data through 2008, but this would create some bias for our
experiment. The forecasts of such a model from 1999-2008 would contain the influence of the
hypothesized recent "unknown" factors in so far as they are partially correlated with economic
fundamentals and hence alter the parameters of the latter
.
" Malpezzi (1996) has produced such an instrument for measuring regulation, but it is available for only
half of our markets, and not over time, and its construction has been the subject of debate.
formation. Thus there is little evidence of at least a national supply "shortage" that might
have instigated the recent price inflation.
, ^^
In an earlier paper, we examined out-of-sample forecasts from 1998 through 2006
- using a wide range of univariate models (Wheaton and Nechayev, 2007). These models
all greatly under predicted the increase in prices over those 8 years in 60 MSA - where
prices were measured using the widely available OFHEO indices. Here, we will test the
forecast ability of a more complicated 2-variable VAR model - with an additional 2 years
of valuable data when prices have fallen. We also use a different price series. The 2
variable VAR model is shown in (2) and it includes a similar vector of "conditioning"
economic variables (X() as did our earlier univariate models. Here Prices are regressed on
lagged prices, (current) economic variables and then lagged stocks. The parallel equation
regresses stock on lagged stocks, economic variables and then lagged prices. The lags
again correct for autocorrelation, and there are well known tests to select the number of
lags. For this model system to make sense, the sum of lagged price coefficients in the
price equation should be less than 1 .0 and similarly for the sum of lagged stock
coefficients in the stock equation. One also expects the sum of stock coefficients to be
negative in the price equation and the sum of prices to be positive in the stock equation.
Finally, it is hoped that the conditioning variables have the signs anticipated by economic
theory, but this is not a strict requirement of VAR analysis.
LogP, = f^a,LogP,_, + P'LogX, +f^A,LogS,_^
Logs, = Y^a^LogP,_^ +P^LogX,-^Y^A^LogS,_,
The model in (1) is implemented using quarterly data from 1979:1 through 2008:2
although our back test truncates the data at 1998:4. The stock data is constructed by
taking the 1980 census single family stock and adding on quarterly single family starts.^
The price data used this time is the 10 city CSW price data that is widely cited and forms
the basis for Futures Trades on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The CSW indices tend
' This ignores unit demolitions, but when demolitions are calculated as the difference between decade
census stock counts and cumulative starts, they are virtually nil except for the 1960-1970 interval.
to show a greater decline over the last two years relative to the OHFEO data. The results
of estimating the equations are generally quite similar across markets.
The model is estimated individually for each of the 10 MSA markets with the
published CSW price data. The included economic conditioning variables are MSA total
employment (Empl), total personal income divided by employment (Wage), and the 30
year fixed mortgage rate (Mortg). Experiments using both real and nominal rates were
tried with in this instance nominal working better. To illustrate the models and their
application in more detail, the estimated equations (described above) for each model are
presented Appendix I. Figures 3-5 also present the historic data along with the described
out-of-sample forecasts starting in 1999:1 for the markets of Boston, Miami and Los
Angeles. These markets illustrate the range of forecast outcomes across the 10 CSW
markets. The vertical axis is the log of the real price level.
Figure 3: Boston House Prices
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Figure 4: Miami House Prices
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Figure 5: LA House Prices
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The case of Boston shows the smallest forecast "miss" (20%). Interestingly the
time pattern of the forecast is exactly the opposite of what actually occurred. Rather than
following the rise and then fall of actual prices, the model has prices forecast to fall and
then recover. The model's forecast in the case of Boston is easily explained, by turning to
the economic fundamentals in the second frame of Figure 3. Starting in mid 2001 there is
a downturn in the local economy almost as severe as the downturn in 1989-1992 and
more severe than that in 1980-1983. Furthermore, the recovery from 2003-2008 is
actually less robust than that after the previous two episodes. Finally, the fall in interest
rates from 2001-2005 appears no greater than that which occurred in the four years
following the previous two recessions. Given these movements in fundamentals, it is easy
to understand how the model calls for a correction after 2001 and then mild recovery. The
forecasts for Chicago and San Francisco are similar to Boston - each "missing" by
comparable magnitudes.
Miami is similar to the only other "resort" market in the CSWIO sample - Las
Vegas. In these markets, after years of relatively flat real house prices, a completely
unexplained doubling in prices occurs from 2000-2006. Nothing in the economic
fundamentals shows any abnormal growth during this period, and after 2006 prices
appear to be in free fall. , .-
The third market illustrated, Los Angeles, is similar to New York, San Diego and
Washington. In these markets, the "miss" is around 60% - with again far less run up in
prices and little forecast correction over the last 1 8 months. In almost all markets not only
are price levels always under forecast, but the pattern of price movements is opposite as
well. There is no "up-down" movement, rather only a smoother trend with a "dip".
In most, but not all cases, the 2-equation VAR models "work" in the sense
discussed previously. Referring to Appendix I, the sum of lagged price coefficients is less
than one in all price equations and the sum of lagged stock coefficients is less than one in
the stock equation. The stock coefficients are all negative in the price equation, but
significant in only 4 of 10 cases. A puzzle is that the price coefficient in the stock
equation is never significant and is negative as often as it is positive. Also, many of the
coefficients for the economic variables are not statistically significant and often are of the
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"wrong" sign. The ability of the 2 variable VAR to predict the changes of the last decade
is really no better than the univariate model results in our earlier study.
IV. The Unique factors over the last Decade.
One factor that has changed in the last ten years that could easily explain an
unusual growth in prices - is the soaring national rate of homeownership. Between 1965
and 1995 the homeownership rate fluctuated between 62 and 64 percent with little
discernable trend. After 1995 it jumped 5 percentage points and at the end of 2006 stood
at 69% (Figure 6). Since then it has retreated a full percent - down to 68% - and is
expected to fall further. These movements were so pronounced that from 1998-2006 the
total number of renters in the US actually declined for the first time since WWII. What
this meant is that each year from 1998 to 2006 almost 400,000 renter households
switched to owning. A movement in demand this large would certainly be expected
soften rents and put great pressure on prices - a pattern Shiller [2005] labels a "bubble".
In the 2 years since 2006, the number of renters has grown sharply and the number of
owners has actually declined. The question then is what has changed in the last decade to
explain these dramatic shifts?
Figure 6: US Homeownership
Homeow nership Rate, % Renter Households. Mil
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As discussed in our earlier study, we like many others suspect that the growth in
US homeownership and hence prices was driven by an explosive growth in credit
availability from the creation of the so-called "sub-prime" lending market. The
emergence of this market in the mid 1990s is perfectly timed with the beginning of the
sharp rise in US homeownership. Prior to this time, most households with poor credit
ratings, or households seeking very aggressive underwriting were simply rationed out of
the mortgage market. Since then, "risk-based pricing" provided ample credit in these
situations - albeit at significantly higher rates - and often with subordinated loans. There
seemed to be no end to investors' appetite for securitized pools of such "risky" loans. By
2005 almost a quarter of all loans originated each year were sub-prime and the stock of
sub-prime loans had reached 8% of total US mortgage debt (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Expansion of Mortgage Credit
$ Billions Percent
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A number of studies have begun to explore the emergence of the Sub-prime credit
market. Some have investigated whether pricing adequately reflected the market's higher
default rates, others the question of whether lenders were somehow predatory in
attracting borrowers. In 2004 a special issue of the Journal of Real Estate Finance and
Economics was devoted to this relatively new market. Several more recent studies have
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tried to identify geographic differences in tiie penetration of this type of lending (e.g. Ho
and Pennington-Cross [2006]) and borrower self-selection between credit markets (Ben-
Shahar [2006]) . Since 2006, the US Subprime market has unraveled and foreclosures
have surged [Foote, Gerardi, Willen (2009)]. A recent paper by Wachter and Pavolv
(2008) finds that markets where price declines from 2006-2008 are greatest are also those
markets with the largest prior-period price increases.
The current housing market has also seen a record number of housing sales to
investors and 2" home buyers. The most direct way to examine such buying is to look at
loan origination records (again for home purchases) - wherein the borrower must declare
(by law) whether the financing is for purchase of a primary home, 2"^* home or investment
propert)'. This data is available from Loan Performance Inc. and goes back to the late
1990s. The sum of "investor" and "2" home" originations as a share of all originations
has increased sharply since 1999 (Figure 8). This reported data is also just for 1-4 family
units, and the 2" home share and its growth would likely be greater had condominiums
sales been included. In addition, they also miss 2" home purchases financed with
expanded primary home loans or with all-equity.
,nd
Figure 8: 2 Home Purchase Share
Investment and 2nd Home Loans as Share of New Loans, %
10 20 30 40 50
San Diego W^^S^Ml.
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As discussed in our earlier paper, purchases of 2" homes may explain why prices
rose so dramatically over 2000-2006 despite record housing construction and slowing
household creation. Someone was purchasing the "excess production". What is important
about 2"'^ homes and investment properties is that such buying can more significantly
affect a market's "net supply" or vacancy. Many primary home purchasers make "churn"
moves from one house to another - hence a transaction has little impact on market
vacancy. A purchase/sale by a 2"'^ home owner can subtract/add more directly to vacancy.
It is interesting to speculate on the causes of this recent buying trend. Some
suggest that it has resulted from baby-boomers "pre-buying" for retirement. Other's offer
up that housing became viewed as a "safe investment" relative to stocks and bonds -
particularly after the 2001 decline in the stock market. With only aggregate time series,
true explanations will be impossible to identif}'. In our earlier paper, we did show that
across 60 markets the magnitude of the price forecast error (in 2005) was highly
correlated with the level of 2"'^ home purchasing. Causal inference, however, is again a
bit tricky. If residual home prices are rising for some other reason, that could generate
investment buying in addition to the converse. There clearly can be joint causality
between these variables. ., '
V. What do we know about Prices and Sales and the Inventory?
As shown in Figure 9 below, there is a strong positive correlation between
housing sales (expressed as a percent of total owner households) and the movement in
housing prices. Likewise there is a strong negative correlation between prices and the
inventory. Superficially these relationships seem contemporaneous, and so recovery in
prices would seem to go hand in hand with a recovery in sales and drop in inventory. The
causal relationship between the variables however is more complicated and so before
drawing any conclusions, the relationship between these variables needs to be examined
much more carefully. To date there have been several different interpretations of the
strong empirical relationship. .
14
Figure 9: US Housing Sales, Prices, Inventory
Sales, Inventory as % of stock
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In one camp, there is a growing literature of models describing home owner
"churn" in the presence of search frictions [Wheaton (1990), Berkovec and Goodman
(1996), Lundberg and Skedinger (1999)]. In these models, buyers must always become
sellers - there are no entrants or exits from the market. In such a situation the role of
prices is complicated by the fact that participants both pay higher prices, but also receive
more upon sale. It is only the transaction cost of owning 2 homes (during the moving or
trade period) that grounds prices. If prices are high, the transaction cost can make moving
so expensive as to erase the original gains from moving. In this environment Nash-
bargained prices move almost inversely to expected sales times - where this equals the
vacant inventory divided by the sales flow. In these models, both the inventory and sales
churn are exogenous. Following Pissarides (2000) if the matching rate is exogenous or of
specific form, sales time will be shorter with more churn and prices therefore higher.
Hence greater sales cause higher prices. Similarly greater vacancy (inventory) raises sales
times and causes lower prices.
There are also a series of paper's which propose a relationship in which changes
in prices w ill subsequently generate higher sales volumes. This again is a positive
relationship between the two variables, but with opposite causality. The first of these is
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by Stein (1995) followed by Lament and Stein (1999) and then Chan (2001). In these
models, liquiditj' constrained consumers are again moving from one house to another
(market "churn") and must make a down payment in order to purchase housing. When
prices decline consumer equity does likewise and fewer households have the remaining
down payment to make the lateral move. As prices rise, equity recovers and so does
market liquidity. Relying instead on "behavior economics", Genesove and Mayer (2001)
and then Englehardt (2003) show empirically that sellers who will experience a loss when
they sell tend to set higher reservations than those who will not experience a loss. With
higher reservations, the market overall would see lower sales if more and more sellers
experience loss aversion as prices continue to drop. As long as prices are rising, however,
the theory makes little prediction about what will happen to sales.
In a recent paper, Wheaton and Lee (2009) show convincingly that there are two
strong causal relationships in the data - between prices and sales.^ On the one hand,
greater sales "Granger cause" subsequent house prices to rise. This reinforces the
theoretical arguments made by search theory. At the same time, higher house prices
"Granger cause" lowev subsequent sales. This is the opposite aggregate relationship from
that suggested by the arguments based on liquidity constraints or loss aversion. With
these two schedules operating, it must be the case as shown in Figure 10 that the -
(negative) pricing-based-sales schedule is historically shifting the most - for only then
would we observe the strong positive association between sales and prices that we see in
Figure 9. •
With this in mind, it becomes increasingly clear that the recent run up in sales and
prices were likely caused by a significant rise (or outward shift) in the negative "pricing-
based-sales" schedule. Subsequently the fall in prices likely results from an inward shift
in the schedule. This makes it quite important to more clearly understand the exact
determinants of this schedule and how it might shift in reaction to exogenous factors.
'' Wheaton and Lee (2009) base their conclusions on the analysis of a large panel of 101 MSA housing
markets over 25 years.
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Figure 10: Sales-Price Relationships
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VI. Why do High Prices discourage Sales?
Looking forward, shifting the negative "pricing-based-sales" schedule (outward)
would certainly restore both sales and prices to the housing market, but without a better
understanding of the underlying determinants of this schedule, assessing the likelihood of
this is difficult at best. Hence our original question "what will it take" cannot be
answered. To better get a handle on what generates such a downward schedule, we
reproduce the following analysis of the 2001 AHS - again from Wlieaton and Lee (2009).
Figure 1 1 charts out all of the gross housing flows in that year. •
As discussed previously, much of the theoretical literature on sales and prices
investigates how existing homeowners behave as they try and sell their current home to
purchase a new one. This flow is often referred to as "churn". To fully determine all of
the other flows in the housing market, we must do a bit of interpolation using the various
questions that the AHS asks of its respondents (current household heads). In "Table 10"of
the Survey, respondents - who moved within the last year - are asked what the tenure was
of the residence previously lived in. The total number of movers in this question is the
same as the total reported in "Table 11" - asking about the previous status of the current
household head (respondent). In "Table 1 1" it turns out that 25% of current renters
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moved from a residence situation in which they were nol the head (leaving home,
divorce, etc.). The fraction is a smaller 12% for owners. What is missing is the joint
distribution between moving by an existing head and becoming a head. The AHS is thus
not able to fully identify' how many current owners (for example) moved either a) from
another unit they owned b) another unit they rented or c) purchased a house as they
became a new or different household.
To generate the flill set of flows, we use information in "Table 1 1" about whether
the previous home was headed by the current head, a relative, or an acquaintance. We
assume that all current owner-movers who were newly created households - were counted
in "Table 10" as previous owners. For renters, we assume that all newly created renter-
movers were counted in "Table 10" in proportion to renter-owner households in the full
sample. Finally, we use the Census figures that year of the net increase in each type of
household and from that and the AHS move data are able to identify household "exits" by
tenure. Gross household exits occur mainly through deaths, institutionalization (e.g.
nursing home) or marriage. . -
.
Focusing on just the owned housing market, the AHS also allows us to account
for virtually all of the events that add to the inventory of houses for sale (identified in
Figure 1 1 as LISTS) and all of those transactions that remove houses from the inventory
(identified as SALES). There are two important exceptions however, and these are
identified in Figure 1 1 with dashed boxes. In 2001 the Census reports that 1,242,000 total
units were delivered to the for-sale market. Since we have no direct count of demolitions^
we use that figure also as net and it is counted as additional LISTS. The second is the net
purchases of 2" homes, which count as additional SALES, but about which there is
simply little data^. In theory, LISTS - SALES should equal the change in the inventory of
units for sale. These relationships are depicted in Figure 2 and can be summarized with
the identities in (1) below (2001 values are included). .
' The growth in stock between 1980-1990-2000 Censuses closely matches summed completions suggesting
negligible demolitions over those decades. The same calculation between 1960 and 1970 however suggests
removal of 3 million units.
^ Net second home purchases might be estimated from the product of: the share of total gross home
purchases that are second homes (reported by Loan Performance as 15.0%) and the share of new homes in
total home purchases (Census, 25%). This would yield 3-4% of total transactions or about 200,000 units.
There are no direct counts of the annual change in 2"'' home stocks.
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Figure 11: US Housing Gross Flows (2001)
ind
Net 2" Home Purchases
=? (SALES)
(1) New created
owners = 564,000
(SALES)
Renter to Owner =
2,422,000 (SALES)
( 1 ) New created
Renters = 2.445.000
Owner to Owner = 2,249,000
(LISTS & SALES)
Owners = 72,593,000
Net Increase = L343.000
Renters = 34,417.000
Net Increase = -53,000
Renter to Renter = 6,497,000
(2) Owner Exits =
359,000 (LISTS)
Owner to Renter =
,330,000 (LISTS)
Net New Home deliveries
1,242,000. (LISTS)
(2) Renter Exits
1,360.000
SALES = Own-to-Own + Rent-to-Own + New Owner [+ 2"'' homes] = 5.281,000
LISTS = Own-to-Own + Own-to-Rent + Owner Exits + New homes = 5,179,000
Inventory Change = LISTS - SALES
Net Owner Change = New Owners - Owner Exits + Rent-to-Own - Own-to-Rent
Net Renter Change = New Renters - Renter Exits + Own-to-Rent - Rent-to-Own (1)
The only other comparable data is from the National Association of Realtors
(NAR). and it reports that in 2001 the inventory of units for sale was nearly stable. The
NAR however reports a higher level of sales at 5.641.000. This 7% discrepancy could be
explained by repeat moves within a same year since the AHS asks only about the most
recent move. It could also represent significant 2" home sales which again are not part of
the AHS move data.
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What is most interesting to us is tliat almost 60% of SALES involve a buyer wiio
is not transferring ownership laterally from one house to another. So called "Chum" is
actually a minority ofsales transactions. The majority of transactions, various inter-
tenure SALES, also are the critical determinants of change-in-inventory since "churn"
sales do not affect it.
The 60% of sales created by non-churn would all seem to be events that one
might expect to be sensitive (negatively) to housing prices. When prices are high
presumably formation of newly created owner households might be discouraged or at
least deflected into renting. Likewise moves which involve changes in tenure from
renting to owning also should be negatively sensitive to house price levels. We are
agnostic about the determinants of 2"'' home buying, but the other decisions simply
involve questions of affordability.
Figure 1 1 provides a more complete picture of the DS housing market and offers
an explanation for the two schedules between sales and prices depicted in Figure 10. The
positive sales-based-pricing schedule is the result of owner-to-owner moves, as discussed
in search based models of housing. The downward schedule represents the net effect of
inter-tenure moves. Along that schedule, when prices are high SALES decline as net
entrants into ownership contract. At the same time LISTS grow and so does the
inventory. : .:. - -• ' .
VII. A Road to Price Recovery '
The discussion above indicates that for prices to recover sales have to grow and
the inventory has to shrink. There are however, many channels through which this can
occur. First, rent-to-own moves have to increase and own-to-rent moves decline.
Ameliorating foreclosures clearly helps here. Second, investor and 2"^ home buying has
to pick up. Third, new home deliveries have to decline (possibly even further) and also
stay low for some period of time. Finally, if vacant units can be converted from owner-
for-sale to vacant-for-rent (this is another form of investor purchase) the inventory is
again reduced. All of these would help to shift the downward schedule in Figure 10
outward. In addition, we might imagine that once the recession ends, consumer
confidence returns, and that owner-to-owner churn will also pick up. This however is
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already represented by movements along the upward "sales-based-pricing" schedule
rather than a shift in that schedule. In Table 1 below, we have tried to add up these factors
to examine how the inventory for sale might respond.
The first two columns of Table 1 present historical values for 2001-2005 and
2006-2008. Some of the figures involve extrapolation to fill in the end of year 2008
numbers. The Table also indicates when numbers are estimated or assumed. The
columns headed "Estimate" give plausible outlooks for each of the next three years. In
2009, we assume that the recession continues. This generates record low rates of new
construction, together with continued demolitions. On the demand side, foreclosures are
assumed to be almost as bad as 2008, although this also generates considerable own-to-
rent unit conversions. Second home demand is expected to pick up a bit as households
shop for bargains in Southern and Western markets.
In 2010 the economy bottoms and begins a slow recovery. Construction remains
low, however. Household formation picks up a bit and foreclosures are now far lower.
This is likely to be the year when 2" home purchases are highest as prices will be at a
bottom. By 201 1, foreclosures have stopped and the net own-to-rent flow is assumed to
be neutral (stable homeownership rate). Non occupier demand starts to trail off since
much of that inventory has been absorbed in the previous 2 years. Finally, new
construction begins to increase, although it is still way below the levels needed to sustain
long term demand.
The entries in the final three rows in Table 1 - before the total inventory change is
calculated - all represent guesses (these are noted with asterisks). Demolitions often have
been assumed to be .25% of the stock - or around 200.000 units yearly (Harvard JCHS.
2006). These estimates however are not based on any hard data from demolition permits
- rather (as discussed in note 3) they are residual calculations from the AHS sample
numbers on households, and vacancy, compared to stock numbers constructed from
summed new completions. Such a residual for owned housing then actually also includes
conversions. To separate the two, here we assume that conversions are 60% of the net
inter-tenure flows. Some fraction like this must have occurred, for inter-tenure flows have
been too large in the last decade relative to vacancy rate changes and stock growth.
Finally, net 2" home sales (as opposed to churn) is estimated based on the following:
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15% of all gross sales are of this type (Loan Performance, Figure 8) and 25% of gross
sales involve a new home purchase. We do not know how many new homes were
,nd
actually absorbed by 2" home buyers, or the net change in the 2" home stock.
Table 1: Inventory Reduction Forecasts
Average Annual Change, -Ths.
2001-2005 2006-2008
Estimate
2010
Total households 1 1,015 1,070, 900| 1,0001 1,100!
! Owner Households (-) i 1,030! 360 -190! 480; 740i
i
due to overall growth 1 680 720 610j 680 740
due to changes in homeownership rate 1 350 -360
i
-SOOf -200
Total completions T 1,730! 1,53F" 450| "W 850]
j Completions for Sale (+) i 1,460; 1,310| 315; 385, 5951
'Demolitions*(-)
i
200j 220 200| 225] 175j
Net conversions from rent to own*(+)
j __210] .2T5[~" -500 -120
Q-
Non-Occupier Demand* (-) L_ 200! 235^ 2^ 300! 1501
''
Change in For Sale Inventory
i
240: 280i 44Si -740 -470!
As of the end of 2008, the for-sale inventory stood at about 4.1 million units as
compared to 2.4 million during much of the period from 1995 through 2001. This latter
level of inventory together with brisk sales of course caused prices to rise quite
significantly - in real terms. From our analysis it looks like a reduction in the inventory
to 3.2 million would be sufficient to at least restore price stability. Hence at the annual
reductions in Table 1, it appears that prices will probably bottom some time in 2010 and
rise in 201 1, possibly even above inflation. Of course, several factors might hasten this
recovery. These would include a more dramatic increase in 2" home sales, or policies
from the new Administration that either ameliorate foreclosures, or alternatively policies
that facilitate the flow of units quickly back into the rental market. It is also becomes
clear how keen a role supply plays in these scenarios. Without continued severely
depressed new construction, together with conversions and demolitions, a recovery will
be slower. In either case recovery does not appear "right around the corner", nor of
course can the decline in prices continue indefinitely.
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Appendix I
Table 3. V.\R Model of Real Home Prices
Market
Independent Varia bles - Coefficients
Const ^Price ^Stock Em pi Wage Mortg R^2
Boston 2L18 0.87 -1.86 0.30 0.61 -5.67 0.9957
Chicago L51 0.89 -0.03 -0.20 0.26 -6.12 0.9853
Denver 4.34 0.90 -0.43 0.27 0.07 -5.44 0.9860
Las Vegas -0.10 0.81 0.15 -0.08 -0.13 4.46 0.8838
Los Angeles -L36 0.91 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.70 0.9947
Miami
_
..,.f.:'i^' 3.60 0.78 -0.27 0.11 0.08 -0.25 0.9622
New York 18.11 0.95 -1.21 0.03 0.11 -5.05 0.9957
San Diego -0.61 0.92 -0.03 0.12 0.11 5.05 0.9857
San Francisco
Washington DC
1.64 0.91 -0.15 0.02 0.15 -1.25 0.9890
L48 0.95 -0.21 0.06 0.31 -1.99 0.9925
LRHPI(peak)
Actual Forecast
4.94
4.91
4.71
5.24
5.38
5.42
5.15
5.28
5.15
5.27
4.70
4.58
4.15
4.53
4.75
4.51
4.42
4.77
4.84
4.77
Table 2. VAR M()del of Housing Stock
Market
Indeper dent Varia bles - Coefficients Centr
R''2Const XStock ^Price EmpI Wage Mortg
Boston 0,0434 0.9970 0.0016 0.0003 -0,0027 -0.0526 0.9999
Chicago 0.2869 0.9711 -0.0006 0.0195 -0.0032 -0.0762 0.9996
Denver 0.1514 0.9832 0.0012 0.0072 0.0065 -0.1834 0.9999
Las Vegas "'-,jisi: 0.3421 0.9616 -0.0046 0.0321 -0.0051 0.1655 0.9999
Los Angeles 0.0956 0.9877 -0.0009 0.0088 0.0050 -0.0525 0.9999
Miami 0.1997 0.9727 0.0015 0.0207 0,0053 0.2050 0.9998
New York 0.3125 0.9761 0.0004
0.0003
0.0053
0.0169
0.0018
0.0163
-0.0350
-0.1177
0.9999
0.9999San Diego 0.1892 0.9729
San Francisco 0.2137 0.9822 0.0011 0.0020 0.0019 -0.0459 0.9999
Washington DC . 0.1627 ., 0.9757. . -0.0029, 0.0239 0.0027 0.1922 . 0.9999
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